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Storm over Foreign Funding  
Continues in Egypt 
Kinga Brudzińska 
Similar to the situation before the Arab Awakening, state control of civil associations in Egypt remains 
intact. Correspondingly, foreign funding for NGOs is still a controversial, selective and sensitive topic. 
Despite the objections of civil society and the international community, a new draft law on NGOs 
presented in September 2013 will most likely maintain the idea of state oversight of civil society 
organisations. The European Union, and Poland itself, should constantly monitor the status of the new 
draft law and actively encourage the authorities to comply with international standards. Despite 
difficulties with delivering the aid, the EU should stick to its values while supporting Egypt’s transition 
and continue to provide aid to local NGOs. 
The systemic transformation in Egypt has produced a range of visible emotions in civil society, from joy to 
frustration and impatience. The expressions of relief or anger after the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi 
from power has resulted in extreme political polarisation, deteriorating economic conditions, and 
restrictions on freedom of association and media, which has resulted in the dominance of the army in the 
country’s political system. The adoption of a restrictive protest law on 24 November, the approval of a 
new draft constitution by a constitutional committee that grants the armed forces special privileges, and the 
proposal of a new, restrictive NGO draft law diminish hopes that the new government will fulfil its promise 
to restart the democratic political process. The difficult living conditions in Egypt are also reflected in the 
Legatum Prosperity Index, an annual ranking based on various factors such as wealth, economic growth, 
and quality of life, where Egypt ranks near the bottom (108th out of 142 countries).  
The Egyptian transition is also characterised by a disturbing new increase in efforts to tarnish the image of 
international human rights organisations and local civic associations, especially those working in the field of 
public freedoms and rights. The state-run newspaper Al-Ahram recently published a six-part series vilifying 
such groups as the National Democratic Institute (NDI) for funding a “fifth column” that endeavours to 
destabilise Egypt.1 
Even more controversial than the work of civil associations has been their foreign funding. Consecutive 
governments have accused such organisations, including those that focus on culture, the arts and education 
but receive foreign funding, of being foreign agents and traitors, even though NGOs cannot find funding in 
Egypt and are necessarily forced to get it from non-Egyptian sources. This trend was seen during Morsi’s 
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rule when the political forces accused each other of allowing their NGOs to be financed from abroad, using 
it as an argument to prove external interference in internal affairs. Last June, an Egyptian court convicted a 
total of 43 Americans, Europeans, Egyptians and other Arabs for participating in illegal pro-democracy 
activities, and ordered the closure of the international NGOs involved in the so called NGO case—U.S.-
based NDI, the International Republican Institute (IRI), Freedom House and the German political 
foundation Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. This policy reflects, foremost, the negative perception of 
international aid from the West, not only by Egyptian authorities but also society, which has been 
manipulated by state-sponsored media. Even though in comparison with 2012 Egypt has improved its 
ranking by eight positions in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index, in 2013 it still 
ranks 158th out of the 179 countries measured.2 Moreover, in November 2013 Reporters Without Borders 
sent out an alert that a policy by the new Egyptian authorities to repress media and control information 
reflects a continuation of practices in effect since 2011.3 According to polls conducted back in 2005, only 
6% of Egyptians believed U.S. democratisation policy (69% of respondents thought democracy support is 
not the real objective of U.S. policy). It is worth mentioning that the negative view towards the United 
States is not related to a rebuff of American values but rather a rejection of American policies in the Arab 
world. To Egyptians, like most Arabs, America’s democracy promotion efforts are a fig leaf for wars 
designed to control oil and help Israel. After June 2013, there was also a shift in the perception of Western 
aid. While in the past the negative perception was directed mainly at U.S. aid, it changed to include aid from 
the EU, which is now viewed with suspicion by some groups in civil society. 
The most worrying indicator in the Egyptian transition is that due to protracted political turmoil and 
uncertainty about the future of the systemic transition, people tend to be more willing to accept harsh 
provisions proposed by policymakers. Recent polls conducted by Baseera, the Egyptian Centre for Public 
Opinion, show that 57% of Egyptians who had heard of the recently passed, controversial draft protest law, 
approve of it. Of respondents, 62% also approve of another bill announced by authorities to combat 
terrorism.4 This could suggest that the enactment of the restrictive NGO law could be even more socially 
acceptable in Egypt.  
 
What is the Problem with Foreign Funding? 
While budget support to Egypt differs from civil society funding from abroad, the perceptions of both types 
of aid seem to influence and stimulate one another. The different sources of external aid that flew into the 
country after the 2011 revolution (especially from the Arab Gulf countries as well as from the West) make 
the picture of external funding even more complex and confusing for society. 
Between June 2011 and 2013, Qatar was one of the biggest economic supporters of Egypt, having deposited 
during President Morsi’s administration aid worth $7.5 billion. Today the military-backed government 
receives government aid from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait worth about $14 billion. 
To compare, the amount of Western aid provided to Egypt—the U.S. provides on average $1.6 billion and 
the EU has allocated broadly $207 million annually between 2007 and 2013—is a tiny drop in the bucket of 
                                                          
 
2 The index reflects the degree of freedom that journalists, news organisations and others enjoy in each country and the efforts 
made by the authorities to respect and ensure respect for this freedom. See: “2013 Reporters Without Borders World Press 
Freedom Index,” http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2013,1054.html.  
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 Reporters Without Borders is a non-profit organisation that has consultant status at the United Nations and UNESCO. See: 
“New Wave of Attacks on Freedom of Association,” 5 November 2013, https://en.rsf.org/egypt-new-wave-of-attacks-on-freedom-
of-05-11-2013,45420.html.  
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total foreign aid.5 Still, Western aid specifically for strengthening civil society, which is only a small part of 
the total of foreign aid, remains undesirable in Egypt. EU assistance to civil society organisations and non-
state actors provided under the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), the European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), or thematic programs under the Development and Cooperation 
Instrument (DCI) amounted to about $4.3 million annually between 2007 and 2013.6 U.S. assistance to civil 
society groups reached an average of $13.5 million per year in the same period (with a significant decrease 
from $20.4 million in 2010 to $1.5 million in 2013).7    
There is a common perception in Egypt that NGOs with foreign funding serve the donors’ interests rather 
than genuine causes on the ground and that they allow foreigners to interfere in Egyptian domestic issues. 
Robert Becker, an American NGO worker who was convicted in the NGO case and received a two-year 
jail sentence, said in an interview for the Washington Post in October 2013 that in practice his conviction 
was related to rhetoric accusing him of being a spy with the intention to divide Egypt. As a result of the 
case, in which the final order included a mandate to close the offices of five foreign NGOs, there is not a 
positive environment for re-opening or setting up new international organisations.  
According to Minister of Social Solidarity and Justice Ahmad al-Borai, in light of the country’s current policy 
on fighting terrorism, NGO control is inevitable given the critical threats the country is facing. This past 
October, the Ministry of Solidarity and Justice started discussions with the National Council for Human 
Rights to draft an anti-terrorism law “specifying terrorism crimes and penalties facing perpetrators.” 
Therefore, in the mindset of the interim authorities, the restrictions on foreign funding and government 
monitoring of NGOs are supposed to prevent sponsoring “groups of evil” that are a menace to national 
security.  
 
Civil Society under State Control  
Due to the restrictive laws under which civil society operates and the lack of appropriate funds, human 
resources, and administrative capabilities, the NGO sector in Egypt is weak. But the problem of civil society 
in Egypt has never been about bureaucracy or a lack of coordination amongst government bodies, rather 
the issue has always been the absence of enough political will to allow civil society to work freely. Even 
though the level of oversight of NGO activists did not increase after the 2011 revolution, it did not 
decrease either. Interventions in daily work without legal support persist, i.e., denial of licenses and 
approval to receive foreign funds as well as vague grounds given for the denial of an NGO’s mandatory 
registration. There are also sanctions on violations of NGO laws (for example, for conducting “political 
activities”), which include dissolution, prosecution, and even imprisonment. It has become common 
knowledge that registration or funding requests are granted only following the acceptance by the various 
state security entities. There have even been some cases in which the Ministry of Social Solidarity has 
refused to allow the registration of an NGO on the basis of an unsuccessful security clearance. As Law 84 
of 2002 does not say anything about the role of the security apparatus in this process, when such cases are 
taken to court, the denial of the registration is often overruled. It seems that even the Ministry of Social 
Solidarity does not even try to cover up the security apparatus’ interference in the operation of NGOs.  
Even though charity organisations (numbering around 42,000, of which 20% are large organisations) seem 
to be a more popular form of organisation and dominate the non-profit sector in Egypt, the estimated 
                                                          
 
5 “The EU–Egypt Relations,” the European Commission MEMO/13/751, 21 August 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
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number of associations, foundations, non-profit companies, and unions has slightly grown in the last five 
years, from 24,500 in 2007 to 30,000 in 2013 (this number is small if we compare it, for instance, with 
Poland, which has half the population but some 80,400 active NGOs).8 The existence of different legal 
statuses in Egypt for NGOs has to do with the level of government interference in their activities. Due to 
the fact that the Ministry of Social Solidarity and Justice, which is responsible for the registration and 
oversight of associations and foundations (informally, the process is controlled by the security agencies), 
most of the organisations that operate in such areas as human rights, free media, and civic education, 
register as not-for-profit companies (civic companies or law firms). Therefore, they are subordinated to the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade, which does not monitor their activities. Under the law, NGO engagement 
in “political activities,” which translates into NGO advocacy and watchdog activities, is forbidden.   
 
A Change without Change 
Since 2002 when Law 84 was enacted, there have been several theoretical attempts to lift its restrictive 
provisions. In practice until now, every proposed draft law equally limited freedom of association. For 
example, the draft law from May 2013 included a provision to create a Coordination Committee that 
would consist of four representatives from both the ministries and “concerned entities”—which was a 
clear reference to security and intelligence agencies. The claim that the coordinating committee would be 
created to facilitate interactions between government bodies bore no proof. The bill also viewed foreign 
funding and domestic fundraising through donations (Art. 14) as a crime warranting a fine of $1,400–14,000, 
and even the dissolution of the NGO. The ouster of President Morsi meant the draft law did not enter into 
force.  
In July 2013, the military-backed government called again for changes in Law 84, and formed a High 
Committee to draft the NGO law committee, and by September had already concluded its work on the 
bill. Although Minister of Social Solidarity Ahmed al-Borai made sure the committee included 18 
representatives from civil society (i.e., lawyers, political activists, and representatives of labour unions, 
women’s organisations and young people) and that the draft law passed through several community 
dialogue sessions, many civil society representatives at the local and international levels believe that the 
new law will keep maintaining state control of the NGO sector, as there is little political will for 
constructive changes. There are four main areas of concern about the new draft NGO law: 1) foreign 
funding, 2) international organisations, 3) the status of not-for-profit companies, and 4) penalties for 
violations.  
As for funding, the draft law does not allow NGOs to receive funding from abroad without prior approval 
from the Ministry of Social Affairs (the novelty is that if the ministry does not object within 30 days, the 
NGO may, however, use the funds). The draft law does not set up clear grounds on which the ministry 
may object or specify what an NGO should do with the funds if the court rules them to be impermissible. 
As for international organisations, the draft bill neither specifies the kind of documents they should present 
in order to be registered with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor the period for registration, which may 
prolong the process indefinitely. The negative impact of the draft bill on non-for-profit companies seems to 
centre on the prohibition of entities that perform work similar to an NGO, and includes a fine of about 
$290 for each case of a lack of compliance. Finally, the law allows the ministry to file a request to dissolve 
an organisation based on rather broad grounds, such as an NGO’s “failure to achieve its objectives.”  
So, in fact, if the proposed NGO draft law is similar to the recent protest law and if passed, it will not be 
fully in line with international standards and with Egypt's commitments under international human rights 
laws that Egypt has signed. In particular it would violate Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil 
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and Political Rights, Article 10 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and Article 20 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the right to freedom of association with others. Even though 
some restriction on foreign funding is possible, it is acceptable if applicable by law and applied to maintain 
national security, public systems, public health and morals, or protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. Any other restrictions on foreign funding are not compatible with such agreements as the UN 
Declaration on Human Rights Defenders from 1998, which ensures that each country is responsible for 
protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms by  adopting the necessary steps to provide the proper 
environment.9 One of these steps is to guarantee the right of individuals or groups to search for, receive or 
utilise  resources in order to support and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. Therefore, it is 
not allowed (with some exceptions) to put restrictions on the right to freedom of association.  
 
Conclusions and Recommendations for the EU and Poland  
Civil society plays an important role in pressuring the transition to democracy. A range of historical 
examples, such as those in Poland, Indonesia and South Africa, also demonstrate that broad-based and 
peaceful civil society movements are a crucial factor in helping young democracies consolidate and sustain 
their activities. One of the most effective steps that civil society organisations can take in the early stages of 
a transition, however, is to adopt democratic representative politics. Only in this manner will they be able 
to fulfil functions such as checking and correcting abuse of power, disseminating information and ideas, 
empowering citizens, and ensuring the effective functioning of democratic institutions by monitoring voting, 
parliament or the budget. On the other hand, the policymakers’ role is to strengthen the rule of law in 
ways that allow civil society to flourish. Civil society always needs, and deserves, strong laws to underpin its 
legitimacy. But the laws should obviously help them to participate freely in civic life rather than restrict 
their activities. Receiving funds is considered a mainstay of civil associations and should not be seen as a 
crime. Even, for example, the failure to fulfil legal requirements for disclosure of funding sources should not 
be considered a crime and should not be harshly penalised, but rather face such consequences as the 
removal of tax exemptions.  
The European Union, and Poland itself, should constantly monitor the status of the new draft NGO law and 
actively encourage the authorities to comply with international standards. The EU already has experience in 
working with the Egyptian authorities on these issues. Following a meeting with EU Special Representative 
for Human Rights Stavros Lambrinidis on 11 February 2013, Egypt’s former minister of Justice requested 
the Venice Commission’s assistance in the preparation of the law on NGOs. The working meetings were 
attended by representatives of both sides and took place in Cairo on 11–12 March 2013.10 EU high-level 
visits to Egypt followed these efforts. If there would be enough political will on the Egyptian side, bearing in 
mind the EU’s extensive network, its first-hand knowledge about the process of the creation of the 
previous draft law (i.e. the EU Delegation in Cairo focuses on human rights and democracy),11 and 
information on international freedom of association standards prepared for Egyptian authorities in March 
                                                          
 
9 The declaration is not, in itself, a legally binding instrument. However, it contains a series of principles and rights that are based on 
human rights standards enshrined in other international instruments that are legally binding, such as the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (to which Egypt is a part). Moreover, the declaration was adopted by consensus by the General Assembly, 
and therefore represents a very strong commitment by States to its implementation. See: “Declaration on Human Rights 
Defenders,” www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/SRHRDefenders/Pages/Declaration.aspx.  
10 The meetings were attended by: Peter Paczolay, member of the Venice Commission; Simona Granata-Menghini, Deputy 
Secretary of the Commission; the Minister of Justice and the Working Group within his Ministry; as well as representatives of the 
European Union Delegation to Egypt. See:  “European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission),”  
CDL (2013)017, 28 March 2013, http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(2013)017-e. 
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conduct human rights diplomacy directly with third countries and promote human rights through a broader variety of activities, 
such as observing trials and protecting human rights defenders. “EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and 
Democracy,” EU, 25 June 2012, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf. 
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2013 by the Venice Commission, the chances for successfully lobbying for a decent NGO law could be 
higher.12  
Apart from diplomatic leverage, despite limited EU influence, to affect the legal environment in which civil 
associations and companies operate, the Union should stick to its values while supporting Egypt’s transition 
and continue to provide aid to local NGOs. Due to the rapidly changing environment, the EU should, 
however, ensure that its policies reflect the local context (for instance, when it enabled the granting of aid 
to not-for-profit companies). It should also direct aid not only to the biggest and most established civic 
associations and companies but also to smaller players, such as those working on media freedom, tolerance, 
civic education, and women’s issues that were established after the 2011 revolution but which had to cease 
their activities or maintain a low profile after the NGO case. 
While the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) has already started to distribute funds, it could also 
deliver support for non-registered actors or those lacking necessary funds for administrative work. The 
EED, members of whom have already been to Egypt once to meet with civil society representatives there, 
should take a cautious approach, build its network capacity while relying on the EU Delegation and EU 
Member States’ diplomatic corps, and try to reach out to a greater variety of human rights and democracy 
activists and defenders. The EU could also keep creating a platform for dialogue between it and the 
Egyptian government and opposition. Apart from a high-level visit by EU officials to Egypt, the EU could 
expand youth-to-youth forums that could gather various actors from different political backgrounds outside 
Egypt. The EU-Middle East Youth Forum in Brussels, created by the European Parliament, that will take 
place in December 2013 is a good start.  
As there is confirmation by the Higher Elections Commission that 67 local NGOs have been granted the 
right to observe voting on the referendum on Egypt’s amended constitution (probably in January 2014) and 
forthcoming parliamentary elections (March/April 2014), the EU should encourage capacity-building and 
knowledge transfers to approved NGOs. The EU Member States could also follow Poland’s example in 
terms of sharing its experience with the Egyptian Higher Elections Commission in which five Egyptian 
election officials, including Abdel-Moez Ibrahim, the head of the Supreme Elections Committee, accepted a 
Polish invitation to observe its parliamentary election in October 2012. Gaining first-hand experience in 
holding free and fair elections could serve officials, and if possible, also Egyptian security forces, media, 
judges, and NGOs, to develop an efficient way to manage and implement large-scale elections.  
Although Egypt was not included as a priority country, unlike Tunisia and Libya, in the Multiannual 
Development Cooperation Program 2012–2015 or in the “Support for Democracy” programme 2014 
(which did include Tunisia) implemented through the Polish democracy support agency Solidarity Fund PL, 
Poland should consider increasing aid to Egypt in the next budget period. This aid could be delivered 
through the Solidarity Fund PL or other means, such as a system of small grants distributed by the Polish 
embassy in Cairo. The additional funds could help with the organisation of seminars in Egypt or workshops 
in Poland for, for instance, young activists, politicians, and NGO leaders from various political backgrounds 
on national reconciliation and “Round Table”-type agreements, and help them to build negotiation skills and 
creative and critical thinking, or with capacity-building. Having experience already in working with Tunisia, 
Polish NGOs could start working with Egyptian NGOs once the political situation stabilises. Poland, as a 
country with broad experience in democratic transformation, could also share with Egypt practical 
knowledge in creating laws, such as those for NGOs, and actively support the activities of the EU in its 
commitment to working closely with all stakeholders to ensure that new laws are fully in line with 
international standards. A jointly signed letter offering experience and best practices on the regulation of 
the work of NGOs, which was shared in a meeting with Egypt’s Shura Council, and co-signed by the Polish 
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Ambassador, is a good example of giving moral support to the democratic transformation as well as 
technical knowledge to Egyptian policymakers.13  
There is no doubt that enabling a fruitful transition and promoting democracy in Egypt is an extremely 
difficult and frustrating task for outsiders, but the alternative—a failing Egypt left on its own—is worse for 
European interests. Increased Polish engagement with such an important country in the region would 
certainly strengthen Poland’s position as a visible, credible and responsible participant in global processes 
and international cooperation. On the other hand, it would help create suitable conditions for the 
development of civil society in Egypt.  
 
The Policy Paper is a result of cooperation between the Polish Institute of International Affairs and the Al-Ahram 
Centre for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo facilitated by the Anna Lindh Foundation’s “DAWRAK–Citizens for 
Dialogue” twinning programme.   
 
 
      
 
 
                                                          
 
13 The letter was signed by the ambassadors for the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland, and the 
Deputy Chief of Mission of the European Delegation on 25 March 2013. See the letter at www.swedenabroad.com/en-
GB/Embassies/Cairo/Current-affairs/News/Ambassador-Steeghs-letter-to-the-Shura-Council-sys. 
